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ABSTRACT
The author uses recent survey data to evaluate the plausibility of three competing
metaphors for North America: community, mosaic, or fortress. While there is sup-
port for all three metaphors, the mosaic metaphor of separate national societies
coexisting within a common economic space appears to most closely fit the empir-
ical data. This model has been challenged by the profound influences of American
concerns with security and an increasingly isolationist outlook toward the world.
The author discusses how the various social, political, and economic forces cur-
rently at play may alter the North American trajectory in the future.
Key words: North America, NAFTA, border security, national identity, international relations
105
NORTEAMÉRICA. Year 2, number 2, July-December 2007
North America: Mosaic, 
Community, or Fortress?
FRANK GRAVES*
* Frank Graves is president of EKOS Research Associates, Inc., Ottawa (fgraves@ekos.com). The author would
like to acknowledge the very helpful role of Andreas Boehm, who assisted in preparing this paper. He also
would like to thank his colleagues at EKOS Research, in particular Angela Scanlon and Derek Jansen.
Additionally, he received very helpful comments from reviewers of this paper. Finally, he would like to
thank Robert Pastor for his ongoing encouragement and advice on this topic.
Adapted from a presentation originally made at the Fifty-ninth Annual WAPOR Conference, Montreal,
2006.
106
FRANK GRAVES
NORTEAMÉRICA
INTRODUCTION
Many commentators and scholars have attempted to describe the evolving nature
of North America relations. A variety of sharply different descriptions of North
America are evident, ranging from an emerging community (Pastor, 2001) to trans-
national regions (Grab and Curtis, 2002) to less-than-eager partners or a “reluctant
trinity” (De Palma, 2001) to elementally and increasing distinct societies (Adams,
2004). This has also been an important public issue as evident from the fierce de-
bates around the original Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) to its most recent appearance on the political agenda in the form
of the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) of North America in Montebello,
Canada (August 2007).
Clearly, the interrelationships among the three constituent countries are pro-
foundly different today from what they were before the establishment of NAFTA. The
relationships are also very different from the European experience following the orig-
inal Maastricht Treaty and the evolution of the European Economic Community. In
this overview, we attempt to identify the current trajectory of North American rela-
tions. We do so by empirically evaluating the plausibility of three different met-
aphors for North America: mosaic, community, or fortress? 
This analysis is drawn from the perspective of the citizens of those societies as
expressed through the tools of public opinion research. Some critics of the current
public debate around the SPP have bemoaned the fact that general public input is a
conspicuous lacuna in the current process, dominated more by business leaders and
politicians. Notably, our research suggests that public opinion is indeed poorly cap-
tured by protestors and “civil society.” Neither do business leaders nor media pun-
dits seem to capture the true public mood. The evolution of public opinion and
attitudes and values is an important missing ingredient from current debate and, in
many cases, jarringly disconnected from the narratives evident in the popular media.
So, as my colleague Robert Pastor has noted (Pastor, 2007), the right-wing rhetoric
of Lou Dobbs, among others, is no more representative of true American public opin-
ion than the leftist, nationalist positions of spokespersons such as Maude Barlow in
Canada. In general, we find public support for trade liberalization and deeper eco-
nomic integration has converged at a point of strong support in all three countries
following a period of equally strong opposition in the early 1990s.
Importantly, this support for free trade has not produced a diminution of nation-
al identities and a corresponding rise in continental identification. Initially, theorists
such as Karl Deutsch predicted that closer integration of both values and identities
would be the result of deeper trade liberalization. To a great extent, this prediction
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has been borne out in the European experience. The North American trajectory, how-
ever, is qualitatively different from the European experience where national identi-
ties now co-exist with a nearly equal sense of European community.
As Figure 1 highlights, local identities have been declining in North America
while national attachment continues to rise. This strong sense of national identity has
resulted in continental attachment being a relatively minor and flat force compared to
Europe, which has seen local identities rise, national attachment decline, and Euro-
pean identity rise dramatically over the last few decades (also see Figures 2 and 3).
In our view, the North American trajectory may best be described as an eco-
nomic community co-existing within a societal mosaic. The mosaic metaphor has,
however, been challenged recently by the salience of concerns with security and threat
in the post-September 11 world. In this article, we will assemble some of our recent
tracking of North American public opinion in order to put these shifts in a clearer
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Figure 1
TRACKING PRIMARY IDENTITY
Q: To which of these groups would you say you belong, first and foremost?
Base: Most recent data points, Canada, January 2005; United States, March 2006. * Earlier track-
ing provided by World Values Survey.
Source: EKOS Research Associates.
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Figure 2
PRIMARY IDENTITY
Q: To which of these groups would you say you belong, first and foremost?
Base: June 2005, Canada n = half sample; U.S. n = half sample; Mexico n = 1510
Source: EKOS Research Associates.
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Figure 3
COMPLEMENTARY IDENTITIES
Q: Would you say you see yourself as...?
Source: EKOS Research Associates; European data provided by Eurobarometre.
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perspective. The results are both surprising and important as political leaders dis-
cuss options for the future of North America in a dramatically different global con-
text. The citizen perspective, even gleaned through the flawed lens of public opinion
research, is a crucial missing ingredient in the current debate about North America.
Our results consider other external data sources but rely most heavily on our
ongoing surveying of publics in all three countries under the aegis of the Rethinking
North America syndicated project (EKOS Research Associates, 2002-2007). We also
utilize some of the more recent comparative U.S.-Canada data drawn from our ongo-
ing syndicated Security Monitor (EKOS Research Associates, 2002-2007).
Our article is organized into the following four areas:
1. North American Relations and Reciprocal Images
2. Risk and Security: North America in an Era of the “New Normal”
3. Trade, Borders, and Population Flows
4. Identity and Values in North America
NORTH AMERICAN RELATIONS AND RECIPROCAL IMAGES
Since 1999, we have been tracking indicators of how the citizens of North America
view their neighbors. The tracking is less recent and less complete in the case of
Mexico. But we have a fairly good sense of how the public of each country views
the other countries and how this has changed.
It is important to situate these trends in the broader context of how Americans
view the external world and vice-versa. For example, there has been a marked
decline in favorable impressions of both Canada and Mexico in the United States
over the past five years. There also has been an even earlier decline in favorable
outlook on the United States within both Canada and Mexico. Yet, it is very impor-
tant to understand that these trends of eroding outlook are actually more modest
than the generalized decline in global outlook on the U.S. and the subsequent ero-
sion of U.S. outlook on the external world. In other words, the declining reciprocal
outlooks may have less to do with specific bilateral issues than with the broader
shifts in global antipathy to the United States and, in particular, the direction the U.S.
administration’s foreign policy has taken since the Iraq invasion. Similarly, declin-
ing U.S. outlook on Canada and Mexico is not particularly notable compared to
broader declines in its outlook on the broader external world. It may be that, follow-
ing the exuberant internationalism evident in the U.S. public in the aftermath of Sep-
tember 11, we are witnessing the emergence of neo-isolationism in the United States.
Ironically, the decline in external views of the U.S. is directly mirrored within the
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U.S., itself, where we now find that a staggering 70 percent of Americans believe
that their country is headed in a fundamentally wrong direction (EKOS, 2007).
At the close of the last decade we found largely positive attitudes among the
North American neighbors. American attitudes to Canada were fairly murky but
highly favorable, while U.S. attitudes towards Mexico leaned favorably, but were
much more mixed. In fact, asymmetrical U.S. attitudes to Canada and Mexico are a
major barrier to deeper integration. Canadian attitudes to the U.S., while largely
positive, are more mixed than U.S. attitudes toward Canada and are based on high-
er levels of fluency and attention. Canadian attitudes to Mexico are largely positive.
Mexican attitudes to the U.S. and Canada lean favorably and are dominated by
images of economic opportunity. As noted above, these attitudes have become mod-
estly less positive over the past five years.
Figures 4 and 5 display some of these trends. Notable in Figure 4 is the large
and growing discrepancy in favorable U.S. outlook on Canada vis-à-vis Mexico.
Although U.S. attitudes to Canada are far less favorable today than they were in
2003, they have rebounded somewhat recently. Mexico, however, has moved from
revealing a modest plurality of favorable outlook, in 2003, to a mild plurality of
unfavorable outlook today. Perhaps, more tellingly, unfavorable outlook on Mexico
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Figure 4
RECIPROCAL IMAGES: U.S. OUTLOOK ON CANADA AND MEXICO
Q: In general, would you describe your opinion of ...as favorable or unfavorable?
Base: All Americans.
Source: EKOS Research Associates.
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is now three times as prevalent among the U.S. public as it is for Canada. This stark
and widening asymmetry is expressed in many other realms, notably, an expressed
desire for closer relationships, attitudes to the free movement of people, and per-
ceived threats to national security.
A few concluding observations on the nature of North American relations are,
in order: 
• The growing asymmetry in U.S. outlook on Canada (relatively positive and
benign) versus Mexico (increasingly negative and closed) poses important
obstacles for deep North American integration. 
• The recent erosion of Canadian outlook on the United States, while signifi-
cant, should not be overstated. Canadians still identify the United States as
their best friend, whereas Americans have replaced Canada with Britain in
this category. Canadian’s disapproval of the U.S. is largely focused on the
administration and mirrors internal dissatisfaction in the U.S. public, them-
selves. It also is proportionately smaller than the rise of these sentiments in
Europe. There is deep ambivalence in Canadians’ outlook, but 95 percent of
both Americans and Canadians feel it is at least somewhat important to
strengthen the relationship (see Figure 6). 
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RECIPROCAL IMAGES: CANADA/MEXICO OUTLOOK ON THE U.S.
Q: In general, would you describe your opinion of the United States as favorable or unfavorable?
Base: Canadians and Mexicans.
Source: EKOS Research Associates.
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• The significance of rising isolationism in the United States is a crucial factor
for the future of North America. It is a second-wave response to the pervasive
transformation of the United States which occurred following September 11.
The initial desire to go out into the world and inoculate the United States
against terror through viral democracy has been replaced by a new wariness
of the external world. This is expressed in extremely high resistance to immi-
gration, increasingly negative views of the external world, rising protection-
ist sentiments, and a sharp and rising tilt to retrenching the focus on domestic,
not international, issues. The significance of these effects is uncertain but a
crucial question will be whether U.S. instincts will be to pull up the drawbridge
at the forty-ninth parallel/Rio Grande or to favor a continental perimeter. So
far, there is evidence that both are favored;  a sort of “belt and suspenders”
strategy. In both Canada and the United States, the trajectory is for support
for less porous borders while perimeter support has softened somewhat (see
Figure 7).
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Figure 6
IMPORTANCE OF IMPROVING CANADA-U.S. RELATIONS
Q: How important do you think it is to improve the quality of U.S.-Canada relations?
Base: Americans, May 07 n = 1000; Canadians, May 07 n = 1006
Source: EKOS Research Associates.
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RISK AND SECURITY: NORTH AMERICA IN AN ERA
OF THE “NEW NORMAL”. THE THREE METAPHORS
The underlying question in this paper is what is the most appropriate description
of where North America is headed? We outlined three broad hypothetical models:
A North American Mosaic
This is the metaphor which we believe most closely describes the North American
trajectory to date, but which has been challenged and disrupted by issues of secu-
rity in the early twenty-first century. This model features deep economic integration
while preserving strong and even strengthened national identities with trilateral
legal and administrative institutions that are quite weak. Hence, strong separate
societies coexist within a shared marketplace.
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SUPPORT FOR A COMMON SECURITY PERIMETER
Q: Would you support or oppose Canada, the United States and Mexico establishing a common
security perimeter?
Base: Most recent data points from June 2005; Canada overall n = 2005; U.S. = 1505; Mexico = 1510
Source: EKOS Research Associates.
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A North American Community
This is tantamount, but not identical, to the notion of a European community, with
not merely economic interdependencies but stronger political and legal institutions,
though not compared to the European community. It also features a heightened
sense of continental identity; Robert Pastor develops a unique conception of a North
American community, which is profoundly different from the European experi-
ment based on origin, composition, balance of members, and so on. His recommen-
dation for institutional reform is less stringent than the European experience. It still,
however, entails the emergence of greater sense of continental community (Pastor,
2001). In our view, this metaphor does not closely correspond to the public opinion
trends observed to date, nor the political agendas of the three states. While there is
some polling evidence that suggests it may become a plausible outcome in the future,
to date, however, this has not been the case.
Fortress North America
This dramatic term is used to convey the possibility that the unabated U.S. focus on
security and threat, coupled with growing isolationism and disenchantment with
foreign affairs, produces a major shift from the broad enthusiasm for globalization
and internationalism evident in the early part of the decade to a new, more isolat-
ed, continentalism. Perhaps the notion of a North American “haven” would be a
less spectacular term to describe this notion. The impacts of a further security shock
tantamount to, or eclipsing, September 11 would, undoubtedly, accelerate the plau-
sibility of this metaphor. The crucial question would, then, become whether Can-
ada or Mexico, or both, would seek greater union with an even more isolated
United States.
The pervasive and transformative effects of concerns with security, threat, and
terror are, perhaps, the most important new forces altering the North American tra-
jectory. As noted, earlier, the mosaic model seemed to line up most closely with the
observed data. Since September 11, however, the fortress metaphor is posing a seri-
ous challenge to the continued unfolding of the common marketplace/distinct soci-
ety (mosaic) metaphor.
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THE SECURITY ETHIC AS THE “NEW NORMAL”
Any proper understanding of the future of North America must take into account
the salience of security and threat. The unusual prominence of security has pro-
duced a fairly stable and deeply rooted “security ethic” that brings together a con-
stellation of values and attitudes which place concerns with terror and security in
a dominant position vis-à-vis many other societal priorities (e.g. civil liberties, eco-
nomics, sovereignty, and convenience). This security ethic is equally powerful in
both Canada and the United States, although there are important differences in the
nature of risk perception and preferences for a national security strategy (Graves,
2005). Our Mexican research suggests that there is a commitment to security issues,
as well. But the public commitment is considerably more tepid and rooted more in
a sense of accommodating U.S. concerns (and, hence, Mexican economic interests)
rather than the visceral alarm about terror and threat which continues to extend a
pervasive influence on U.S. society.
One revealing indicator drawn from our past surveys shows that 47 percent of
Americans support the construction of a wall at the Canadian border. As shocking
as this statistic might be (given the long history of the world’s longest undefended-
shared border), it pales in comparison to the 70 percent of Americans who believe
a wall at the Mexican border would be a good idea (as seen in Figure 8). Unsur-
prisingly, our Mexican polling found only 18-percent support for this idea among Mex-
ican citizens.
As Figure 9 shows, there is a broad consensus that the world has become more
dangerous over the past five years. The actual evidence of global risks would not
support the overwhelming rejection of the view that the world may, in fact, be
becoming safer. This increasingly dark and wary orientation to the external world
stands in sharp contrast to the exuberant globalization seen at the close of the last
decade, perhaps best captured in Thomas Friedman’s book The Lexus and the Olive
Tree (Friedman, 1998).
Triggered by September 11, but also reinforced by unique demographics skewed
by the unusual preponderance of aging baby boomers in Canada and the U.S., there
is a newer sense that the balance of global risks to opportunities leans decisively to
the former. The protracted Iraq engagement and seemingly intractable nature of
geopolitical instability in the Middle East have dampened enthusiasm for interna-
tionalism. These new sentiments clearly have challenged the path to further glob-
alization. A crucial question is whether U.S. isolationism will imply continentalism
or nationalism. If continentalism is favored, what are the implications of asymmet-
rical attitudes within, and toward, Mexico and Canada? Finally, we must consider
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Figure 8
ATTITUDES TOWARD BARRIERS AT THE MEXICO-U.S. BORDER
Q: Would you say you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly
oppose the construction of barriers at the U.S.-Mexico border?*
* Please note that no neutral data point was provided in the Mexican questionnaire.
Base: Most recent data points from June 2005; Canada n = 2005, U.S. n = 1505; Mexico n = 1510
Source: EKOS Research Associates.
100
80
60
40
20
0
More dangerous            About the same                  Safer  
Americans                Canadians
63
56
29 38
8 5
Figure 9
TRACKING PERCEPTIONS OF THE SAFETY OF THE WORLD
Q: From your own point of view, do you feel that, overall, the world is safer, more dangerous, or
about the same as it was five years ago?
Base: Americans, May 2007, n = half sample; Canadians, April/May 2007, n = 1006.
Source: EKOS Research Associates.
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increasingly divergent attitudes to cosmopolitanism, diversity, and immigration
across U.S. and Canadian publics, particularly among those under 40.
The new security ethic also has changed citizen expectations of the role of the
state, vaulting security concerns to higher prominence and diminishing support for
traditional trade-offs with privacy, economic, and civil liberties. Figure 10 demon-
strates a sense that governments have not gone “too far” in pursuit of security. A
sense that we are being too reckless in our pace is dwarfed by either satisfaction with
the current pace or by a desire to increase government focus on this priority. This lean
to “security first” is expressed in a broad range of parallel tests and indicators and the
security lean is a fairly stable pattern. We also find that the North American pub-
lics have been generally satisfied with the broad direction of their national govern-
ments in this area –more so than in general terms or with other key policy priorities.
The issue of security has also been politically potent at the balloting box, par-
ticularly in the U.S. In Canada, the issue is politically significant. But “security”
constitutes a broader panoply of threats for Canadians (such as health and the envi-
ronment) than for Americans who give terror threats relatively more one-dimen-
sional prominence. 
100
80
60
40
20
0
Canada                   United States                 Mexico
10
55
33
22
40 35
18
39
33
...gone too far        ...responded appropriately         ...not gone far enough
Figure 10
APPROVAL OF GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO TERRORISM
Q: Thinking about (Canada/the United States/Mexico’s) security response to the issue of terror-
ism, would you say we have...?
Base: June 2005; Canada overall n = 2005, U.S. n = 1505, Mexico n = 1510.
Source: EKOS Research Associates.
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A notable shift that is evident in our most recent U.S. polling (Security Monitor
2007) is that the pattern of broad satisfaction with the governmental direction of
security is eroding rapidly, as is confidence in broad national and federal direction.
It is important to note that this declining confidence is not fueled by heightened
doubts about the significance of security, which remains one of the few areas of
societal consensus in a deeply divided United States. The new factor is a growing
conviction that security efforts, particularly foreign policy and the war in Iraq, have
had the perverse effect of exacerbating the very threats they were designed to
lessen. This combination of steadfast concern with terror and security but profound
disagreement on how to achieve it is fueling a new period of isolationism which is
expressed in increasingly resistant attitudes to immigration, a decisive desire to tilt
to a more domestic-first policy focus, and heightened support for protectionism
and tighter borders.
TRADE, BORDERS, AND POPULATION FLOWS
One of the most crucial aspects of the North American trajectory is the circulation of
people, goods, and services. Public attitudes and public policy in this area have under-
gone tremendous changes over the past two decades. Public opinion and public pol-
icy have not always been in sync, although there are surprising commonalties in the
public opinion trajectories expressed in all three countries of North America. Begin-
ning with attitudes to trade, we have borrowed benchmark measures of support for
trade liberalization and NAFTA from all three countries. We have updated this data
with our own tracking since 1999 and the results are displayed in Figure 11. 
Interestingly, while the FTA and NAFTA were fiercely debated (even after these
agreements were signed), there had been staunch public opposition in all three coun-
tries throughout the previous decade. It is remarkable to note, however, the syn-
chronicity of rising public support in all three countries. The strong majority
support for free trade across North America is a surprise to many critics and “ex-
perts.” Two comments are in order here. First, we have consistently found a large
gap between the media and expert accounts of public opinion and the actual empir-
ical record on many key issues of the day. Second, the strong support for NAFTA,
which continues over to strong support for further strengthening NAFTA, contains
some underlying contradictions. When asked about the overall costs and benefits
of NAFTA, respondents are much more ambivalent; not only are ratings of benefits
more highly divided, but there is a clear belief that the other NAFTA partners have
benefited more. 
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Separate polling of public and private sector elites in Canada and the United
States shows even higher levels of overall support for free trade than from the gen-
eral public. These results fly in the face of the protectionist sentiments expressed by
many media commentators.
A final comment on the trade liberalization issue is in order. In our most recent
iterations of these indicators, we see a modest, but significant, decline in support
for free trade in both Mexico and the United States and, more recently, Canada.
Once again, all three countries are moving in lockstep but the trajectory is now
modestly downwards with respect to support for free trade. The U.S. decline is
notable in concert with a broad range of other data signaling support for a more
insular and isolated United States. These trends may not augur well for the future
of NAFTA. Security, in this instance, may, indeed, trump trade. It is more difficult still
to imagine a community model emerging within this context.
The fact that there has only been a mild erosion of support for free trade is sur-
prising, given the huge salience of security concerns (in the U.S. and Canada mostly)
and the rising support for less porous borders. Figure 12 shows what respondents
in the three countries think should be the dominant consideration in border dis-
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SUPPORT FOR TRILATERAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
Q: Should there be free trade between Canada, the United States and Mexico?
Base: Most recent data points September 2007 Canada overall n = half sample; U.S. n = half sample;
June 2005 Mexico n = 1510.
Source: EKOS Research Associates.
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cussions. In Canada and the U.S., security concerns eclipse issues of sovereignty,
economic advantage, and free movement of people. A modest plurality of Mexicans
select security. In all three countries, these patterns have been stable.
There is a surface contradiction in the strong support for free trade and rising
support for “thicker” borders. Americans and Canadians still support the free move-
ment of their citizens throughout their respective countries. This generosity is
less evident in U.S. attitudes to Mexico, while Canadians are more receptive to free
circulation of Mexican citizens in North America. The recent modest decline in Amer-
ican support for NAFTA may be evidence that this contradiction is challenging sup-
port for trade liberalization. 
Some additional comments are worth noting here. Mexican umbrage at Amer-
ican opposition to Mexican migration and the construction of a border fence is
steeped in much greater emphasis on economic opportunity, lower alarm about ter-
ror, and rising American antipathy. American support for stronger borders is rooted
in rising opposition to immigration and profound and stable concerns with terror
threats. Canadian support for a stronger U.S.–Canada border is an expression of ris-
ing U.S. antipathy and concerns with issues such as keeping out illicit handguns
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Figure 12
SECURITY TOP BORDER CONCERN
Q: In discussions about the (Canada-U.S/U.S.-Mexico) border, what do you think should be the
most important consideration?
Base: June 2005; Canada overall n = 2005, U.S. n = 1505, Mexico n = 1510.
Source: EKOS Research Associates.
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and drugs. In Canada, attitudes to free trade remain the most positive and unaffect-
ed. This links with a unique pattern of low and declining opposition to immigration.
As the United States becomes more isolationist, Canada is more cosmopolitan and pro-
trade. These differences are notable against a backdrop of broader value convergence. 
An interesting anecdotal finding is that, although there is support for more
coordinated North American approaches to key policy areas (for example, the envi-
ronment and security), for Americans, U.S.-Canada integration is more acceptable
than ”North American” coordination. For Canadians and, possibly, Mexicans, the
North American rubric is more acceptable than closer U.S.-Canada integration. 
Figure 13 shows what we consider to be a highly revealing and extremely
important contradictory trend line on attitudes to immigration. At the close of the
1990s, opposition to immigration, particularly those who said there are “too many”
immigrants coming to their respective country, was slightly higher in the U.S. (just
over 40 percent) than in Canada (around the mid-30s). Immediately following the
shock of September 11, opposition rose dramatically. Since then, however, opposi-
tion has dropped off in Canada (running around the mid-20s), while continuing to
rise in the U.S. (now over 60 percent). Mexico tends to look more like Canada on
this indicator and the issue of the Mexican border has a huge effect on American
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Figure 13
TRACKING OPPOSITION TO IMMIGRATION
Q: In your opinion do you feel that there are too many, too few, or about the right number of
immigrants coming to (the United States/Canada)?
Base: Most recent data points, Americans, May 07 n = 1000; Canadians, April/May 07 n = 1018.
Source: EKOS Research Associates.
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attitudes to immigration. Nonetheless, we now have over twice as much opposition
to immigration in the United States than Canada, while the United States is experi-
encing less than half as much (relative to population) immigration than Canada. 
Coupled with higher ethnic diversity in younger Canada than younger Amer-
ica, and more favorable value orientations to diversity in Canada, this may presage
a major potential future conflict. This is particularly so when viewed through the
U.S. security lens and rising concerns with “the border.” This area of value diver-
gence is notable, but not representative, of the overall patterns across a broad range
of values. In the final section we will briefly summarize the patterns of value and
identity convergence and divergence in North America.  
IDENTITY AND VALUES IN NORTH AMERICA
As we noted earlier, North American societies seem to be pursuing a very different
trajectory than European societies in terms of citizen identification and sense of
belonging. Unlike the European experience, we find national identities actually
strengthening in North America. Hence, we have the notion of a mosaic of distinct
societies within an increasingly interdependent economic space (see Figure 1). It
will be interesting to see if the increased pressures of the security ethic reinforce this
trend or produce a search for a continental haven, which could strengthen a sense
of belonging to North America. So far, the short-term evidence suggests it is, once
again, national identity that is strengthening in both Canada and the United States. 
This issue of “identity” is extremely complex and its measurement is quite sen-
sitive to the survey methodology that has been used. The longer term tracking from
Figure 1 used a method borrowed from the World Values Survey (WVS), which forces
respondents to choose one of five sources of identity. One can argue that this ignores
the possibility of multiple, nested, or shared identities. One alternate approach is
that used by the Eurobarometre which allows the choice between primary and
shared national continental identities (see Figure 3). In 2002, we took the opportu-
nity to ask these questions in the three North American countries and to compare
them to the European results. Some have argued that the forced-choice (WVS) ques-
tions may not reveal the possibility of shared national and continental identity in
North America as in Europe.
As Figure 3 shows, the differences between North Americans and Europeans
on this indicator are profound, perhaps as much so as on the forced-choice question.
Canada, the United States, and Mexico all show a strong leaning to solely-national
identification. In Europe, there is more internal heterogeneity across countries but
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the overall differences are vivid. Aggregating across countries (weighted roughly by
population size), we see that the strong plurality of Europeans (48 percent) see
themselves as possessing a shared national and European identity. Whereas about
half of Europeans think of themselves in these shared identity terms, the corre-
sponding incidence in North America is only 20 percent. This tenacious adherence
to nationalism, despite highly convergent economic markets, is one of the most
glaring and crucial differences across Europe and North America. It is one of the
reasons we believe that the mosaic metaphor is a more accurate description than
the community metaphor. 
If anything, the time series data points to a shorter term drift away from an
emerging community metaphor, even recognizing the less stringent institutional
machinery implicit in Pastor’s unique conception of a North American (as opposed
to European) community. There is little evidence of an imminent community emerg-
ing under either the forced choice or shared identity indicators. There is, however,
support for the future possibility of something closer to a community emerging
based on expressed receptivity to trade, shared policy development in certain cru-
cial areas, and evidence of broader value convergence in the shorter term. However,
we note that nationalism is once again on the rise in the United States and Canada and
support for free trade, while still high, is declining. The specter of a North American
fortress may be as plausible as the community metaphor at this particular time. 
The issue of values, roughly seen as the ultimate “ought” statements about
what constitutes the “right” society, is closely related to the issue of identification.
Some theorists have argued that relatively common values may be both a precon-
dition and a result of trade liberalization.
Our data is imperfect but seems to support the thesis that values are relatively
similar across the three nations of North America. Table 1 shows the comparative
results of one value test we applied to all three countries in 2002. The similarities
are far more impressive than the differences. Although there is relative congruence
across all three societies, the U.S.-Canada differences are smaller than those across
Mexico-U.S. or Mexico-Canada. Similar results are obtained using separate indica-
tors that ask respondents how closely certain value statements correspond to their
conception of being an American, Mexican or Canadian. When we retest these
through time, we find remarkable stability in values, as we would expect from the
values literature.
In the case of Canada and the U.S., we are able to use the two different sets of
indicators to conduct a test of whether value differences are becoming greater or
smaller. Recall that we just discussed some significant normative widening in the
areas of diversity and cosmopolitanism. Similarly, there are highly influential
124
FRANK GRAVES
NORTEAMÉRICA
works suggesting the value differences across the U.S. and Canada are elemental
(Adams, 2004) and diverging. We also know that Canadians would emphatically
prefer this to be the case with only 10 to 15 percent agreeing that we should become
“more like the United States.” Yet most Canadians agree that, despite the clear pref-
erence not to become more like the United States, they are, in fact, becoming more
like the United States. The empirical data would support this reluctant conclusion. 
Tables 2 and 3 show that the sum of differences across the sets of value tests has
become smaller, not larger, over the past several years. There is high stability but the
evidence in the shorter term clearly favors convergence. It is crucial to understand
that this occurs while distinct national identities are robust and strengthening,
through time. In other words, closer value alignment does not seem to preclude a
strong separate sense of distinct national identity. 
Table 1
VALUES AND GOALS FOR DIRECTION OF COUNTRY
Q: If you were to direct the federal government, how important would you say each of the fol-
lowing values or goals are in shaping the direction of the country/Canadian society?
(n=2002) (n=2002) (n=500)
Freedom 91 (1) 96 (1) 91 (1)
A healthy population 88 (2) 88 (7) 87 (3)
A clean environment 87 (3) 87 (8) 83 (6)
Respect 87 (4) 90 (5) 83 (7)
Family values 86 (5) 91 (2) 91 (2)
Integrity and ethics 85 (6) 91 (3) 83 (8)
Security and safety 85 (7) 90 (4) 82 (10)
Collective human rights 83 (8) 87 (9) 82 (11)
Tolerance 81 (9) 83 (12) 83 (9)
Hard work 81 (10) 89 (6) 82 (12)
Traditional family values 79 (11) 87 (10) 85 (4)
Innovation 79 (12) 84 (11) 77 (14)
Excellence 77 (13) 81 (13) 82 (13)
National identity 76 (14) 75 (14) 84 (5)
Prosperity and wealth 73 (15) 70 (15) 76 (15)
Redistribution of wealth 72 (16) 67 (17) 75 (16)
Minimal government 65 (17) 69 (16) 67 (17)
January-March 2002 Mean rating on a 100-point scale
Source: EKOS Research Associates.
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Table 2
MEANING OF BEING CANADIAN/AMERICAN*
Q: What does being a Canadian/American 2002 2005
mean to you? CAN U.S. Dif. CAN U.S. Dif.
Leaving a healthy environment to future generations 64 53 11 61 58 3
Having social and health programs to support all citizens 48 31 17 61 39 22
Being free to do and think as I please 60 64 4 60 65 5
Having the opportunity to pursue a good life 58 73 15 58 59 1
Living in a tolerant, multicultural country 61 56 5 55 47 8
Sharing many values and beliefs with other citizens 50 58 8 53 51 2
Having a say in political, social and economic development 47 57 10 47 55 8
Living in the best society in the world 54 498 5 47 44 3
Being able to count on your fellow citizens if you are in need 40 48 8 47 48 1
Feeling distinctly different from people in other countries 39 28 11 35 23 12
Serving my country when it needs me 37 50 13 31 46 15
Paying taxes 31 14 17 20 20 0
Sum of total differences 124 80
Base: June 2005, Canada n = 2005; U.S. n = 1505; * presented as a series of randomly paired choices.
Source: EKOS Research Associates.
Table 3
CONVERGING VALUES?*
Q: How important would you say each of 1998/99 2005
the following goals and values should
be for shaping government direction? CAN U.S. Dif. CAN U.S. Dif.
Freedom 89 94 5 90 95 5
A healthy population 86 87 1 87 87 --
Integrity and ethics 81 87 6 86 90 4
A clean environment 83 85 2 86 86 --
Security and safety 80 87 7 84 88 4
Hard work 79 85 6 80 87 7
Tolerance for different people/cultures 75 80 5 80 81 1
Respect for authority 79 80 1 78 82 4
Traditional family values 79 86 7 77 83 6
Sharing of wealth among rich and poor 72 57 15 74 64 10
Prosperity and wealth 72 67 5 68 69 1
Minimal government intrusions 66 68 2 65 67 2
Sum of total differences 62 44
Base: June 2005, Canada n = 2005; U.S. n = 1505; * presented as a series of randomly paired choices.
Source: EKOS Research Associates.
Two final comments are worth noting. First, the distribution of values operates
very differently in Canada and the United States. U.S. values are highly polarized
and much more differentiated across social class, race, and ideological orientation.
In Canada, the same values are much more concentrated around the center of Cana-
dian society, more consensual and less attached to ideological orientation. Second,
the process of value convergence, under what Inglehart has called the “rhythms of
post-materialism,” probably is a broader characteristic of advanced Western societies.
It is, however, noteworthy that this values analysis does not definitively preclude
any of the three North American metaphors we presented earlier (Inglehart, 1995). 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS: DISRUPTED TRAJECTORY?
The future of North America is highly uncertain. The unique trajectory in place at the
close of the last decade showed a clear alternative to the European community mod-
el. In North America, distinct national societies coexist within a highly interdepend-
ent economic space provided an alternate path to continental economic integration.
This demonstrates an alternative path to continental economic integration. The North
American experience showed that trade liberalization need not necessarily produce
the subordination of national identity and the creation of a continental institutional
infrastructure –e.g., common currency and/or parliament. This “mosaic” metaphor
was an unexpected and interesting alternative to the European community model
and it may, or may not, have contained the seeds of an incipient North American
community. 
Recent history and the current political context within the countries forming
North America seems to render the community model to be less, not more, likely in
the near future. For example, national attachments continue to dwarf a sense of con-
tinental community, and nationalism is once more on the rise in North America. The
large and growing asymmetry in American attitudes to Mexico and Canada act as an
increasing barrier to further integration. Mexico, in particular, represents a special
challenge to deeper North American integration. While value differences are by no
means insurmountable barriers, Mexico is the most “different” and considerably less
welcome by Americans. Moreover, tensions are rising across the U.S. and Mexican
publics. There is, however, continued evidence of overall value convergence which,
coupled with the powerful forces of a shared geography and mutual economic
interest, may, ultimately, facilitate the evolution of a North American community. 
Perhaps an even more important disruption to the mosaic trajectory is the cas-
cading impact of the security shock associated with September 11, which has ma-
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tured into a deeply entrenched security ethic. Ironically, a more deeply integrated
North America may result, particularly in the aftermath of another severe security
shock. The resulting impact of this could probably be better characterized as a North
American fortress or, perhaps, a “haven.”  It is, also highly unclear as to whether
such an episode, coupled with the new isolationist outlook gripping the U.S. public,
would result in either a more insulated and separate United States or a more inte-
grated North America where perimeter security becomes paramount. The growing
asymmetry across attitudes to Mexico and Canada may also produce a more inte-
grated U.S. and Canada with Mexico left as a relative outsider. It will be crucial to
determine whether the growing search for less porous borders and weakening sup-
port for trade continue to the point at which they begin to challenge the still-strong,
shared public commitment to free trade and the growing value consonance across
North American publics. 
The rising gaps in attitudes to immigration, diversity, trade, and cosmopoli-
tanism are also important trends to watch. In the case of Canada-U.S., these stark
and growing differences may produce profound collisions on issues around immigra-
tion and multicultural policies, particularly when scrutinized through the unblink-
ing security lens that continues to dominate the U.S. outlook. The dispute over
immigration and population movements is even more divisive as it applies to Mex-
ico and the United States. 
On a more positive note, we suggest that the growing public preoccupation
with environment and climate change may ultimately trump the shorter-term obses-
sion with security. Our research shows that an integrated North American approach
that explicitly balances the disparate priorities of the three publics over issues of
climate change and the environment, energy and freedom from reliance on the ener-
gy of countries in a state of geo-political instability, and security issues produces
strong public support in all three countries. Moreover, the longer-term perspective
suggests that climate change, in particular, will likely produce major –perhaps, even
unprecedented– population shifts, e.g., away from low-lying coastal cities to a more
newly-temperate north. A fully navigable Northwest Passage is another, profound-
ly important development. Against the backdrop of a turbulent global context, all
of these factors may coalesce to make the future of North America the defining
issue of the twenty-first century.
127
NORTH AMERICA: MOSAIC, COMMUNITY, OR FORTRESS?
SPECIAL CONTRIBUTIONS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ADAMS, M.
2004 Fire and Ice: the United States, Canada and the Myth of Converging Cultures,
Toronto, Penguin.
DE PALMA, A.
2001 Here: A Biography of the New American Continent, New York, Public Affairs.
EKOS RESEARCH ASSOCIATES
2004 “Trajectory North America: U.S.-Canada Relations,” presentation to the
President’s Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Washington, D.C.
2005 “Public Outlook on U.S.-Canada Relations: Ice Age or Cold Snap?”, pre-
sentation to David Wilkins, the United States Ambassador to Canada,
Ottawa.
2007a Rethinking North America, Ottawa, Ekos.
2007b Security Monitor Study, Ottawa, Ekos.
EUROPEAN UNION COMMISSION
2002 Eurobarometre, Brussels, European Union Commission.
2007 Eurobarometre, Brussels, European Union Commission.
FRIEDMAN, THOMAS L.
2000 “The Lexus and the Olive Tree,” New York, Farar, Straus and Giraux.
FUNK, M.
2007 “Cold Rush: The Coming Fight for the Melting North,”Harper’s Magazine,
vol. 315, no. 1888, pp. 45-55.
GRAB, E.B. and J.E. CURTIS
2002 Regions Apart: The 4 societies of Canada and the United States, Oxford, Oxford
University Press.
GRAVES, FRANK
2005 “The Shifting Public Outlook on Risk and Security,” in One Issue, Two Voices:
Threat Perceptions in the United States and Canada, Woodrow Wilson Inter-
national Center for Scholars–The Canada Institute, no. 4, pp. 10-15. 
128
FRANK GRAVES
NORTEAMÉRICA
INGLEHART, RONALD
1990 Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society, Princeton, N.J., Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
1995 Value Change in Global Perspective, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
PASTOR, ROBERT A.
2001 Toward a North American Community: Lessons from the Old World for the New,
Washington, D.C., Peterson Institute.
2007 “Montebello’s Summit is Less than It Seems,” Globe and Mail, August 17,
p. A18. 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER
2007 A Rising Tide Lifts Mood in the Developing World, Washington, D.C., Pew
Research Center.
WAPOR
2006 ”North America: Mosaic, Community, or Fortress?”, 59th Annual WAPOR
Conference: ”Confronting Core Values and Cultural Conflict,” Montreal,
May 17. 
129
NORTH AMERICA: MOSAIC, COMMUNITY, OR FORTRESS?
SPECIAL CONTRIBUTIONS
